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CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100

copies for D/EE (S)

AD/ORE

File

No State notif.

IP-61

19 Jan 50

D/EE: Attn, International Communism Group

Communism in Africa

25X1A

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal

To provide specified intelligence information on Communism in Africa

Memorandum of request is attached.

It is understood that all of Africa is included.

Note that any fragments available should be forwarded in response to this request as available.

Form:

Final Draft, by ICG

Draft due at earliest convenience
(Please notify D/Pub of estimated date of completion)

Responsible Division: International Communism Group

Internal Coordination: D/NE, D/No, D/WE

Departmental responsibilities: None required, although OIR may be asked for contribution.

Classification: Secret

Requester only

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✓ 1. Communism - Africa

SECRET

16 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

ATTENTION :

25X1A

SUBJECT : Communism in Africa

1. This office has a strong requirement for information on the current status of Communism in Africa. Aspects on which information is particularly needed are as follows:

- a. Strength of indigenous Communist groups.
- b. Estimates of potential Communist strength and likely courses of action.
- c. Overt and covert Soviet activity in Africa among or through Communist groups.
- d. Foreign Communist penetration and activity other than Soviet.
- e. Known efforts by the British, French, Belgians and South Africans against Communist activity.
- f. Other significant points not covered above.

2. It is requested that an estimate on the current situation in subject area be produced for this office as early as possible. Any obscure or partial studies known to your researchers would be welcome in the interim.

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Reference:

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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING OF 24 JANUARY 1950
ORE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

25X1A

PARTICIPANTS WERE: 25X1A

D/WE
D/NE
D/WE
D/NO
D/IN

1. In response to a request from OPC for a paper on "Communism in Africa", which was directed to the ORE Committee on International Communism by D/PUB, a special meeting was held in which participants were those members of the Committee whose cooperation was required in the writing of this IP.

2. There was a general discussion of the form and the content of the paper. The members present agreed that they would analyze in detail Communism in the African regions of their jurisdiction and add an area interpretation. It was agreed that the final contributions are to be in finished form.

3. The members agreed on 15 February as a deadline for the contributions. Following the submission and study of the contributions, there will be another meeting before the paper is coordinated and presented in final form by the International Communism Section for the approval of the Committee. The tentative deadline of the final paper was agreed to be 3 March.

25X1A

Deputy Chairman
ORE Committee on
International Communism

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1 March 1950

Chief, D/PUB

Deputy Chairman, ORE Committee on International Communism

IP-61, "Communism in Africa"

1. Attached please find three copies of the requested IP-61, "Communism in Africa".
2. In view of the fact that the paper contains a great deal of valuable material, it is suggested that D/PUB consider it for publication as an ORE. In such an event, the paper will obviously have to be typed up and thoroughly edited.

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Copies to D/FE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: IP-62

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

No notification to State

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 2 Feb 50

To: D/FE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Westerling affair

25X1A

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal

Problem: To provide a brief estimate of the situation involving the Westerling instrumentation in Indonesia.

Scope: The following is specifically desired:

- a. Field of operations
- b. Military strength
- c. Political following and appeal to Indonesians
- d. Relationships to the Dutch
- e. Effect on Indonesian government, present and future.

Graphics (if any): None

Form: Memo, to be drafted in final form by D/FE (orig. & carbon)

Draft due in D/Pub: 8 Feb 50

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Responsible Division: D/FE

8 Feb 50

Internal Coordination: D/WE if necessary

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

1. ~~Westing~~ / insurrection
2. ~~Indonesia~~ - Pol. & govt.

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2 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

ATTENTION : 

25X1A

SUBJECT : Captain Westerling


REFERENCE : 

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1. In confirmation of our conversation of this date, it is requested that this office be furnished a brief estimate of the situation surrounding Captain WESTERLING and his rebel band operating in Java, covering:

- a. Field of Operations.
- b. Military Strength.
- c. Political following.
- d. Appeal to the Indonesians.
- e. Relationship, if any, to the Dutch.
- f. Possible future menace to the Indonesian government.

2. Degree of need is great but not justifying extreme measures.



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8 February 1950

THE WESTERLING AFFAIR

Westerling's operations - On 6 January R. P. P. ("Turk") Westerling, a former captain in the Netherlands Army in Indonesia, sent letters to the USI Government, to the Pasundan Government in West Java and to the UN Commission for Indonesia demanding recognition of his irregular troops, the Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA), as the legal force for law and order in the West Java region. The letters further stated that unless such recognition ^{were} granted by 12 January APRA forces would reject any responsibility with regard to consequences. Westerling's forces were first reported to have clashed with Republican Army (TNI) forces in a short reconnaissance skirmish about 4 miles east of Bekasi in the Djakarta vicinity on 16 January. Early on the morning of 23 January Westerling's APRA forces captured the town of Tjimahi, 11 miles west of Bandung, the capital of the Pasundan State. After fighting en route, about 600 APRA forces, supplemented by at least 300 deserters from the Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), moved into Bandung, killed 70 of the defending TNI troops and withdrew some hours later after negotiations with the Dutch local command. The action at Bandung has been the largest display of APRA force to date. Elsewhere in the area military action by APRA has been confined to gangs of less than 100 men. On 25 January APRA forces seized the rail junction town of Padalarang (10 miles west of Bandung) and disrupted rail service between Djakarta and Bandung for several hours. Fighting was also reported around Tjandjur (30 miles west of Bandung). On 26-27 January small scale fighting broke out in one of the suburbs of Djakarta; 17 APRA men in the area surrendered. Although Westerling's followers have been quiescent since 27 January the main body of APRA forces is believed to be in the Bandung vicinity. Many of the KNIL troops who deserted just prior to Westerling's invasion of Bandung have

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surrendered to their Dutch commanders and they are being held for court martial.

Military strength - The actual strength of Westerling's private army is presently tentatively estimated at 3,000. Most of these troops are believed to be KNIL men, the bulk of which are hard-fighting Indonesian Christians from the island of Ambon. The Netherlands Foreign Office estimates that probably less than fifty Netherlands ^{er} have joined Westerling. Westerling's potential strength, however, is very much greater than the 3,000 now credited to him. The KNIL now has a strength of 30,000 enlisted personnel. As long as KNIL and TNI relations continue to be strained, Westerling has potential recruits in the unabsorbed KNIL and other dissident factions. Westerling's troops are said to be well disciplined and well equipped with arms and motor vehicles, including tanks.

Political following - Westerling has the political support of many divergent groups which have been dissatisfied with Indonesian Republican rule. Aside from the rebellious KNIL elements which constitute the major portion of APRA forces, Westerling is believed to have the sympathy of members of two KNIL "special battalions" of commandos and paratroops. According to USI Government officials these men are trained jungle fighters and have been indoctrinated to hate the TNI. Certain Dutch army and civil officials of the former Netherlands Indies government at Batavia (now Djakarta) are believed to have given moral and material support to Westerling. Westerling is believed to have close connections with Dutch military intelligence as well. Early in January 1950 an official Dutch investigation cleared Westerling of any complicity with dissident Indonesian groups, including disaffected KNIL elements. For decades the Sundanese people of West Java have fought to preserve their separate language and customs from ^{subversion} submission and extinguishment by the more numerous Javanese of Middle and East Java, and it is probably in this connection that Westerling has the support

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of several political leaders in the Pasundan State who are resisting the move, instigated by former Republican leaders, for a unitarian Indonesian state. The Head of the Pasundan State and his Premier are among those who favored a separate state in West Java and who have collaborated with Westerling for this purpose. No direct link has been proven to exist between Westerling and the militant Moslem Darul Islam movement, but such a connection would give him sufficient strength to present a real challenge to the USI. Westerling's cause offers an attractive catch-all ^{for} _^ of those who regard the USI with disfavor: farmers in West Java have resented demands made upon them by the TNI; some TNI troops have deserted to Westerling; and many superstitious peasants regard Westerling as the leader of a mystic religious movement.

Westerling's relationship to Dutch - USI officials claim to have evidence that Dutch officials in Indonesia, both military and civil, have utilized Westerling in a plot against the sovereignty of the USI. A former officer of the Netherlands Information Service, recently arrested by the USI, is alleged to have testified that Koets, the director of the cabinet of the former High Representative of the Crown, is involved in the political aspects of the plot. Economic planning is alleged to have been headed by van Hoogstraaten, the Director of Economic Affairs in the Batavia Government, and, under his direction, financing of Westerling is supposed to have taken place with government funds. The testimony further alleges that military plotting originated with Sultan Hamid of Borneo; Santoso, the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs; and other prominent Indonesians formerly working for the Dutch. The USI further charges that the Westerling organization was created originally by Lt. Gen. Simon Spoor, who commanded Netherlands forces in Indonesia until his death in mid-1949. While they do not question the good faith of higher Dutch officers, USI officials contend that Westerling has received material and moral

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support from elements of the lower echelons of the Dutch army who cannot reconcile themselves to the new order and are determined to make trouble. Indonesian officials criticize higher officers for their inability to control mutinous elements of the KNIL. The available intelligence indicates that many minor Dutch civil and military officials have supported Westerling, but there is little available evidence to implicate higher Dutch officials now in authority in Indonesia. The New High Commissioner in Indonesia has publicly condemned Westerling and denied that he had any connections with the Netherlands Government.

Effects of Westerling's activities - The USI, working with Dutch officials, has the military strength to deal with APRA armed forces, and Indonesian officials consider Westerling's death or arrest to be inevitable. Dutch-Indonesian cooperation on many of the points of dissension will ease many of the problems underlying the Westerling affair. The Indonesian Government, having overcome previous technical difficulties, has issued regulations under which the KNIL will be incorporated in the TNI. The Dutch have offered to accede to any specific request by the Indonesians for action against Westerling, but the Indonesian Government has been exceedingly reluctant to call for the help of Dutch troops. The Dutch also plan to accelerate repatriation of Dutch troops now in Indonesia and to effect a more rapid turnover of arms to the TNI. According to a recent communique the Netherlands Army command has taken the necessary steps to prevent recurrence of desertions and strong action will be taken against further attempts. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government has promised to deal harshly with any Dutch subject aiding and abetting dissidents in Indonesia.

Conclusion - The USI will probably succeed in extending its control to disturbed areas of West Java. The Pasundan State has been placed temporarily under direct administration of the USI Government and a Government Commissioner has been appointed. The Pasundan Cabinet has resigned, the Head of the State has surrendered his mandate, and the Premier is being detained for his complicity

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in the Westerling affair. As a result many of the elements which sympathized with Westerling are being neutralized, and it now appears that Netherlands-Indonesian cooperation at the highest level may lead to the elimination of Westerling and the threat imposed by his private army. Incidents similar to the Westerling affair and threats to law and order involving Communist and other dissident groups, however, will continue to test the stability of the new United States of Indonesia.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: **IP-49**

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **2 February 1950**

To: **D/RE**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: **Economic Information on Bulgaria**

Statement of Project:

25X1A

Origin: **Internal** [REDACTED]

Problem: **To provide information specified in attached memorandum**

Scope: **Notes:** 1. The information requested does not duplicate that provided in IP-52
2. It is requested that parts of this material be forwarded as available. Item "c" of para. 1 is requested first.

Graphics (if any):

Form: **Memorandum material (original and carbon)**

Draft due in D/Pub: **as soon as possible**
(Please notify D/Pub on expected date)

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Responsible Division: **D/RE**

Internal Coordination: **None**

Departmental Responsibilities: **None**

Classification to be no higher than: **Secret**

Recommended Dissemination: **Requester only**

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1 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

ATTENTION :

25X1A

SUBJECT :

Economic Information on Bulgaria

1. This office has a requirement for the following information:

a. Movement of contraband goods in and out of Bulgaria now in progress.

(1) Kinds of goods by sources and destinations (with particular attention to movements of goods from and to the United States) and routes traversed, especially through points in Greece and Turkey.

(2) Organizations active - entrepreneurs, leaders and financiers, and mechanisms used.

b. Legal movement of goods (exports - imports) in and out of Bulgaria, especially with neighboring countries and with non-Soviet zones of Germany and Austria, with Switzerland and with Trieste.

c. Commodities in short supply and in great demand in Bulgaria, especially items with great value relative to weight and bulk (e.g. drugs (penicillin, aureomycin, etc.), diamonds, etc.)

d. Nature of current demand within Bulgaria for hard currencies, e.g., U.S. dollars and Swiss Francs, and nature of current traffic, if any, in such currencies.

2. It will be appreciated if you will advise this office as soon as possible when and if this material can be available.

as soon as possible

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File
8 February 1950

Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE

Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949.

1. In answer to your request of 1 February 1950 our records show the following:

a. Clandestine traffic with the West -- negligible.

(1) Merchandise Movements. Scattered reports have been received from various sources of attempts by Bulgaria to acquire strategic and essential equipment during the past few years. Very few of these, however, have ever been substantiated. Typical examples, covering the more important deals, are listed below:

(a) ITALY--jeeps, trucks, and motor vehicle equipment. The Bulgarian operated firm of SOCI in Milan has been procuring this type of equipment through Italy and Switzerland. Shipments are probably from U.S. military surplus stocks.

(b) ITALY--tin. A shipment of tin plate was imported into Italy from the U.S. and re-exported to Bulgaria under Italian export license. Ostensibly, it was to be used for making tin cans for food canning.

(c) GENERAL--ball bearings. Quantities of ball bearings scheduled under various trade pacts with Western European countries, particularly Italy, appear to be slightly excessive. These could supplement the imports of other Communist countries, all of which are obtaining ball bearings from Western European countries under trade pacts.

(d) SWITZERLAND--jeeps, rifles, motorcycles, machine guns, and similar equipment. A.O.E. Leuprecht-Rapp, Geneva, has recently been reported as involved in a deal to secure these materials.

(e) AUSTRIA--cigarettes. Large quantities of cigarettes have been shipped to USIA for disposal through black market channels.

There is no information regarding clandestine shipments via Turkey or Greece.

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Memo to: [REDACTED]
From: Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE
Subject: Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949

8 February 1950

(2) Organizations involved. Aside from two organizations in Milan, Italy -- SOCI, and Italgrano, -- there are no foreign Bulgarian trading firms. Bulgaria's demands do not warrant the maintenance of independent trading firms and any deals in which the country is involved are probably handled by Czech and Polish commercial organizations, or diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Officials of SOCI and Italgrano, which have interlocking directorships are: Kalnadjiev, Elisser, Mevorah, Picko Alseck, Raefele Pilosov, Assan Kaneff (may have defected, was member of secret police) and Emilio Mazzoleni. Transshipments through Italy are handled in two separate steps, goods are imported into the country, and then re-exported as a separate and distinct transaction. This is probably not done where goods move through free ports, as in these cases export licenses are not required.

b. Legal trade -- 80-90 percent with the Soviet bloc.

(1) Cominform Area. Bulgaria's foreign trade is almost all with the Soviet bloc. This area accounts for 80-90 percent of all exports and imports, 50 to 60 percent being with the USSR and the balance with the other Communist countries. The chief export item is tobacco of which *80%* ~~80~~ *the* percent goes to the USSR (and has been resold for dollars to the U.S.). Other materials shipped to the Soviet Union are lead and zinc concentrates, copper, tin and cement. Principal commodities received from the Soviets are: POL, cotton, iron and steel products, machine tools, non-ferrous metals, tractors, motor vehicles, and fertilizers. Bulgaria's principal satellite trading partner is Czechoslovakia which supplies mainly industrial equipment, such as machinery and power shovels, transport equipment, iron and steel products, chemicals, and textiles in exchange for foodstuffs, skins and hides, non-ferrous ores, and pyrites. Bulgarian trade with the other Cominform countries is varied and does not account for more than 10% of the total.

(2) Neighboring Countries -- Unimportant, except Rumania. No trade is carried on with either Yugoslavia or Greece. The exchange of goods with Turkey is small, a total of approximately \$200,000 for the first 6 months of 1949, a sharp drop from the \$2.2 million total trade in 1948. Only known item traded is charcoal which accounts for half of Bulgaria's exports to Turkey in 1948. A large scale trade

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Memo to: [REDACTED]
From: Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE
Subject: Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949

agreement was reported as signed with Rumania in May 1949 featuring the export of petroleum, lumber, steel drums, corn, cereals, meat, potatoes in exchange for ores, scrap iron, oats, sulphur, and miscellaneous products. While the amounts of some of the items listed appear unlikely, especially sulphur exports from Bulgaria, this list indicates the probable composition of Bulgarian-Rumanian trade.

(3) Trade with the West. -- About 75% with Austria, Italy, the U.K., Switzerland, and West Germany.

Bulgarian trade with the West is practically all with the OEEC countries. Exchanges with this area totaled \$15,673,000 for the first 6 months of 1949 consisting of \$8,361,000 of exports and \$7,312,000 of imports. A breakdown of these figures follows:

(In thousands of dollars for first six months of 1949)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Austria	2,303	1,112
Germany (West)	176	1,381
Italy	1,470	1,959
Switzerland	1,047	1,000
U.K.	1,639	576
Other OEEC Countries	1,726	1,284
Total	8,361	7,312

Details as to the composition of this trade are not readily available. In general, it is similar to that for 1948 when Bulgaria exported mainly foodstuffs, such as hides and skins, fruits and vegetables, meats and poultry, and tobacco to the OEEC countries in exchange for industrial manufactures, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, transport equipment, textiles, and foodstuffs. In 1948 chief sources for the more important imports from the West were:

Electrical equipment
Machinery
Chemicals
Motor Vehicles
Machine Tools
Cotton

Sweden, France, Italy, Germany (West)
Switzerland, Belgium, France
West Germany
France, Italy, West Germany
Italy
Egypt

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Memo to: [REDACTED]
 From: Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE
 Subject: Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949

(4) Trade with particular Western countries -- miscellaneous specific details.

(a) ITALY -- 1b items licensed by Italy:

ball bearings	\$169,801
auto chassis (17 items)	105,108
milling machine (bed type)	9,544
copper wire (5.4 metric tons)	4,999
special electrical steel (15 tons)	6,285
honing machines	17,385
glycerine (900 kg.)	<u>9,745</u>
Total	\$323,067

Italy has also contracted to supply equipment for a hydro-electric power plant valued at \$685,000.

(b) SWITZERLAND. Bulgarian-Swiss trade has been rising steadily since 1947. The first 9 months of 1949 practically balanced, exports from Bulgaria being 6,137,000 Swiss francs and imports 6,158,000 Swiss francs. Chief imports were general machinery and printing ink, and principal exports eggs, tobacco, and corn. Other important imports were watches and other precision instruments, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Switzerland is committed to deliver considerable quantities of capital equipment under a long-term agreement, which includes such items as transformers, electric locomotives, and material for hydro-electric power plants. These deliveries may be jeopardized if Bulgaria continues to fall short of scheduled foodstuff deliveries.

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Memo to: [REDACTED]
From: Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE
Subject: Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949

(c) WEST GERMANY. The \$6.6 million total agreement signed in 1949 between Bulgaria and West Germany is far more important than its value indicates because Bulgaria's prewar industrial equipment was largely and is presently in great need of spares. Featured imports are machinery spares \$400,000; trucks and spares, \$500,000; and mine cars (built to order for Bulgaria during the war), \$150,000. Bulgaria is to ship non-staple foodstuffs and miscellaneous consumer end use items in return.

(d) AUSTRIA. The 1949 Bulgarian-Austrian agreement is similar in composition to that with West Germany. Total trade is scheduled at \$15.2 million. Imports are primarily industrial equipment such as motor vehicles, machinery, steel products, railway equipment, and precision-electrotechnical material. Exports are tobacco, wheat, and other agricultural products. Confirmed specific imports (in railway freight carload lots) are: steel and steel rods, 13; iron pipe, 27; anchor screws, 2; glassware and glass tubing, 22; sulphuric acid, 3; lathes, 2; freight car compressors, 1.

(e) UNITED STATES. Bulgaria's trade with the United States has never been and is not now significant. For the first 11 months of 1949 chief imports, in thousands of dollars, were non-fat dry milk (possibly for relief purposes), \$1,172; raw cotton, \$797; and office machinery, \$69. Shipments to the U.S. consisted mostly of tobacco, \$1,408, and vegetable oils and fats, \$349. *(possibly through USSR)*

(f) TRIESTE. Shipments negligible. For period June through November 1949 imports received via Trieste were 219.5 tons and exports 5.7 tons.

c. Items in short supply -- practically everything except *some* basic foods.

Bulgaria is primarily an agricultural and industrially backward country in the throes of a series of Communist dominated industrialization plans. Therefore, there is little that is in adequate supply. The only light weight, high value items known to be critically short are quinine and atabrine.

d. Bulgarian monetary transactions -- closely tied to USSR.

(1) Gold market activities -- blackmarketing Soviet gold. Bulgaria is active in the world gold market, specifically in Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, and France.

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Approved

From:

Subject:

Finance & Foreign Trade Section, D/EE

Bulgarian Foreign Trade and Financial Transactions in 1949

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Advantage has been taken of the spread between official and black market exchange rates to acquire hard currencies, particularly U.S. dollars.

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Bulgaria became dissatisfied with Swiss regulations for gold movements early in 1949 and have begun to shift business to Amsterdam. Bulgarian gold movements have also been reported through Brussels, Tangiers, Greece, and in South America. All shipments of Bulgarian gold are denied officially.

(2) Balance of Payments Position -- predominately deficit. Bulgaria has a deficit in its balance of payments position with all the OEEC countries, except West Germany, Italy, and Norway. Bulgarian dollar accounts in the U.S. tend to gradually decline and be periodically replenished by transfers from the USSR.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: **D-64**

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **3 February 1950**

To: **D/EE**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: **USSR Exports of Gold**

Statement of Project:

25X1A

Origin: **Internal** [REDACTED]

Problem: **To determine availability of material on USSR exports of gold**

Scope: **See points in memorandum on Case** [REDACTED]

25X1A

Graphics (if any):

Form: **Memorandum, to be transmitted via D/Pub**

Draft due in D/Pub: **3 Feb. '50 at 1900**

(notify [REDACTED] ext. 3075, when draft
is received)

Responsible Division: **D/EE**

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

3 February 1950

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Internal Coordination: **D/EE**

Departmental Responsibilities: **None**

Classification to be no higher than: **Top Secret**

Recommended Dissemination: **Requester only**

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IP-64, Case No. [REDACTED]

**SUBJECT: USSR Exports of Gold, Especially in Connection with
Acquisitions of US Dollars**

25X1A

1. The following information is submitted in response to
Case No. [REDACTED]

a. No information is available which would permit making
an estimate of the USSR gold exports. Indications are that such
operations are relatively small as far as influencing the price of
gold is concerned.

b. Sources and channels for these activities are:

- (1) Foreign banks which have direct banking
connections with the US, the Soviet
Union and the Satellites.
- (2) Private banking houses in centers of black
market gold operations such as Tangiers,
Macao, Bangkok, and Hongkong.
- (3) Personnel and organizations of Soviet
diplomatic and trade representatives, and
various "fronts" in the areas where
Soviets consider such operations essential.

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Note: This is in confirmation of
oral intelligence previously
supplied.

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1 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

25X1A

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : USSR Exports of Gold, Especially in
Connection with Acquisitions of US
Dollars.

25X1A

1. It is requested that [REDACTED] of this branch be placed in contact with someone in your organization familiar with gold movements for discussion with a view to determining the availability of information along the following lines.

a. The extent to which the USSR is exporting gold and directly or indirectly thereby securing dollar funds which are thus made available for financing USSR (or Communist Party) sponsored clandestine operations abroad and for financing operations of groups allied to the USSR or operating in its interests such as the Chinese Communists.

b. The personnel, organizations, and methods used in the procurement of dollar funds for USSR or USSR controlled accounts which procurement involves at some stage the export of gold from the USSR.

2. It is further requested that should such information be available, it be forwarded to this office as soon as possible; or, should it be impossible to fulfill the requirement that a written statement to that effect be furnished.

3. This matter is currently of considerable importance to OPC and it would be appreciated if the meeting could be set up within the next 24 hours.

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Reference: Case [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: **IP-65**

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **6 Feb. '50**

To: **D/WE**

From: **Publications Division, Projects Planning**

Subject: [REDACTED]

25X1A

Statement of Project:

Origin: **Internal** [REDACTED]

Problem: **To provide information on Prof Noack and the Neuheim Circle, and to estimate its significance**

Scope: **The paper should include [REDACTED] with particular reference to [REDACTED]**

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Graphics (if any):

Form: **Memorandum (orig. & one carbon)**

Draft due in D/Pub: **10 Feb. '50**

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

13 Feb. '50

Responsible Division: **D/WE**

Internal Coordination: **D/No if needed; Biographic Register**

Departmental Responsibilities: **None**

Classification to be no higher than: **Secret**

Recommended Dissemination: **Requester only**

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2 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE.

ATTENTION :

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SUBJECT : Prof. Noack and the Nauheim Circle.

1. Request this office be provided a brief background sketch and current estimate on the Nauheim Circle, a Western German group which advocates political neutrality in the current East-West conflict. Prof. Noack, head of the group, is reportedly planning a speaking tour in the German Democratic (Eastern) Republic.

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2. Our need for this information is great. That which is available should be furnished this office on or before 13 February 1950.

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Reference: Case

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Chief, Publications Division, ORR

10 February 1950

Chief, Western Europe Division, ORR

IP-65, The Nauheim Circle

1. Herewith the information requested on Professor Noack and the Nauheim Circle as requested for project IP-65, dated 6 February 1950.

2. In connection with this project, some biographic information has already been informally submitted to the project originator. This information has not been duplicated in this report.

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Attachments:

IP-65, The Nauheim Circle

Annex I, 

Annex II, Extract re Nauheimer Kreis

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